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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATUREOFTHECASE 
This case began as a rescission, fraud/deceit, constructive trust, unjust enrichment, 
conversion, civil RICO, and breach of contract action against Plaintiff Arthur Donald Watkins' 
("Plaintiff'' or "Don") three sons, Arnold Douglas Watkins ("Doug"), Brian Dale Watkins 
("Brian") and Donald Eugene Watkins ("Gene"). Doug counterclaimed alleging a breach of 
contract against Plaintiff related to a Compensation Agreement. Prior to the commencement of 
trial, both Brian and Gene Watkins filed for bankruptcy which prevented Plaintiff from 
proceeding to trial against them pending the outcome of the bankruptcy cases. The issues 
presented at trial involving the remaining Defendant, Doug Watkins, were each party's 
respective claims for breach of contract. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court found in favor 
of Plaintiff and against Doug Watkins. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants/Counterclaimants Arnold Douglas Watkins 
and Virginia Watkins ("Defendants"), on November 6, 2009, alleging multiple causes of actions: 
Rescission, fraud/deceit, constructive trust, unjust enrichment, conversion, civil RICO, and 
breach of contract. 1 Defendants filed an Answer and Counterclaim on January 12, 2012 
asserting breach of contract relating to the Compensation Agreement between Plaintiff and 
1 Clerk's Record ("R."), pp. 22-36. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - I 
a First Amended Complaint on February 1 
their Answer to First Amended Complaint and Counterclaim on February 
Defendants 
2012.4 
Plaintiff and Doug both filed motions for summary judgment. 5 After hearing argument on 
the cross motions for summary judgment the Court dismissed Plaintiffs fraud claim.6 
The trial commenced October 13, 2015, with Plaintiff presenting his case against Doug 
on the breach of contract claim related to the nursing home real estate contract. When Plaintiff 
rested his case without presenting evidence to prove his remaining claims of rescission, 
constructive trust, unjust enrichment, conversion, civil RICO, and punitive damages, Doug 
moved for a directed verdict on these claims. 7 After the motion for directed verdict was denied 
and the Court allowed Plaintiff to dismiss the remaining counts, Doug presented his case for 
breach of contract. 8 
At the conclusion of trial, the Court took the matter under advisement and each party was 
given the opportunity to provide their proposed :findings of fact and conclusions of law to the 
Court.9 The Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated January 11, 2016 
stated that "The only two issues tried at the court trial were: (1) whether Defendant Doug 
Watkins owed Plaintiff money on the nursing home contract and if so, how much, and (2) 
whether Plaintiff owes Defendant money pursuant to a compensation agreement and if so, how 
2 R., pp. 37-57. 
3 R., pp. 587-87. 
4 R., pp. 88-118. 
5 R., pp. 580-676 and pp. 677-734. 
6 R.,pp.1137-1147. 
7 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 154, I. 16 - p. 166, 1. 24. 
8 Id. 
9 R., pp. 1240-1242; and, pp. 1267-1280. 
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Certificate was entered. According to paragraph 4 the Judgment, all remaining ~·-··u~ 
against Arnold Douglas Watkins were dismissed without prejudice. 12 
Doug responded by filing a Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Final Judgment requesting the court reconsider its dismissal of the 
remaining claims against Arnold Douglas Watkins without prejudice for two reasons. The Court 
granted Doug's motion and dismissed the remaining counts with prejudice. 13 
On January 25, 2016 Plaintiff filed a Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees incurred 
in litigating this action pursuant to Idaho Code § § 12-120(3) and 12-121 and Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure 54( d)(l )(C) and 54( d)(l )(D). 14 Doug timely objected. 15 Doug filed a motion for 
attorney fees and costs on February 11, 2016. 16 Plaintiff did not file an objection to this motion 
for attorney fees and costs. The district court entered an order awarding Plaintiffs attorney fees 
and costs on March 4, 2016 without a hearing on Doug's objection. 17 The district court entered 
an order denying Doug's request for attorney fees and costs on March 4, 2016 without a 
hearing. 18 
10 R., pp. 1268-1269. 
11 R., pp. 1661-1665. 
12 R., p. 1663. 
13 R., pp. 1733-1738. 
14 R., pp. 1657-1665. 
15 R., pp. 1696-1708. 
16 R., pp. 1666-1668. 
17 R., pp. 1727-1732. 
18 R., pp. 1722-1726. 
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STATEMENT OF 
Doug is one of six children to Don and Florence Watkins. majority 
Doug's adult life was spent working for his father in various capacities.20 Doug first began 
working fulltime for Don around 1984 and was paid on an hourly basis.21 Doug's employment 
never included medical insurance, disability coverage, workers' compensation, or any type of 
retirement benefit.22 In September 1989, Doug suffered a back injury while working for Don 
which required surgery.23 Eventually Doug recovered and returned to work for his father despite 
physical limitations resulting from the injury. Don acknowledged, in a ·written affidavit filed in 
his divorce action in Utah in 1998 that he had an obligation to pay Doug $1,000 per month for 
injuries Doug sustained while working for him.24 The affidavit also stated Don had been paying 
the amount since sometime in 1989.25 At trial Doug testified he began receiving a $3,000 
monthly salary in 1993 and though the amount did fluctuate over the years, since October 2000 
through February 2009 he received $3,000 per month.26 On September 30, 2000, during a 
conversation between Don and Doug, Don told Doug that "he had made arrangements for our 
lifetime of work for him; and because of our injuries sustained, that he had made arrangement for 
us three boys to get $3,000 a month for life."27 In March of 2009, Brian Watkins utilized his 
19 R., p. 60. 
20 Trial Transcript Day 2, p. 172, 1. 22 p. 174, I. 4. 
21 Id. 
22 Trial Transcript Day 2, p. 216, I. 23 - p. 217, I. 9. 
23 Trial Transcript Day 2, p. 177, IL 2-8. 
24 Defense Trial Exhibit B; Trial Transcript Day 2, p. 308, I. 25 - p. 310, I. 21 and p. 315, 11. 14-17; and, R., pp. 223-
237. 
25 Id.; R., p. 226. 
26 Trial Transcript Day 2, p. 174, I. 5 -p. 180, I. 17. 
27 Trial Transcript Day 2, p. 178, 1. 7 - p. 179, I. 20. 
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greememon Doug 
as payee.28 2000 conversation 
between Don and Doug and was representative of the consistent $3,000 per month payments 
Doug had been receiving immediately after the conversation with Don in 2000.29 The last 
payment Doug received was in February 2009.30 
Don was, by all accounts, a very successful businessman and he and his wife shared their 
success with their children. 31 In 1984 Don and Florence Watkins sold a majority interest in a 
nursing home they owned in the State of Washington to their six children.32 At that time the 
children executed sales contracts each promising to pay a $611,000 purchase price in monthly 
installments.33 The contracts were amended on two occasions over the years in order to reduce 
the amount of the monthly payments.34 As presented at trial, Don officially relinquished the day 
to day management of his business and personal affairs to his son Brian Watkins when he 
executed a General Power of Attorney to him on October 24, 2000.35 Brian Watkins' duties 
included the accounting of payments made on behalf of the children under the real estate contract 
on the nursing home until the General Power of Attorney was revoked in March 2009.36 
Circumstances for Doug changed dramatically when the power of attorney was revoked and Don 
28 Defense Trial Exhibit Y; and R., pp. 317-319. 
29 Trial Transcript Day 2, p. 184, L 24 - p. 185, I. 8. 
30 Trial Transcript Day 2, p. 186, II. 17 - 23. 





35 Trial Transcript Day 2, p. 280, 11. 5 - 11; Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 11; and, R, pp.433-437. 
36 Trial Transcript Day 1 p. 55, 11. 9-11; Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 23; and, R., pp. 460-473 and 877-918. 
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to 
estate contract, with partial payment being February 
2012.37 
Don filed the instant suit against Doug alleging he had defaulted on the real estate 
contract. 38 The relief sought by Don in his First Amended Complaint as it related to the real 
estate contract was as follows: 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter an 
order compelling Doug to produce any and all records relating to Doug's Note, 
including a detailed accounting, compelling Doug to comply with the terms of 
Doug's Note, bringing the same current, and awarding Plaintiff damages against 
Doug under Doug's Note ... 39 
Doug could not produce any records or a detailed accounting relating to his note because he had 
never been involved in any of the accounting on the note; that was Brian's role.40 Don's counsel 
obtained the services of Steve Neighbors to act as Don's conservator pursuant to court order on 
September 8, 2010.41 When Mr. Neighbors was asked at trial if he was able to trace all of the 
transactions, or marshal the assets of Don's estate and the trust estate, Mr. Neighbors replied he 
was not and that he found it beyond his abilities to reconstruct financial records kept by Brian 
Watkins.42 Initially Mr. Neighbors contacted a firm from Portland, Oregon to perform a forensic 
analysis of the financial records, but their estimate to do the work was half a million to a million 
37 Trial Transcript Day I, p. 136, 11. 13-19; and, Trial Transcript Day 2, p. 189, II. 2 - 14. 
38 R., pp. 58-87 at p. 82. 
39 Id. at p. 83. 
40 Trial Transcript Day 2, p. 187, I. 13 - p. 188, L 8. 
41 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 31, 11. 1-3. 
42 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 43, I. 18 - p. 44, I. 2. 
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guarantee 
recordkeeping as "scra..'llbled."44 
results."43 Neighbors 
Eventually Denise McClure was hired to trace the flow of Plaintiff's funds through his 
personal and business accounts to determine what happened to the funds, along with analyzing 
the payments made and the balance Doug owed on the real estate contract.45 Highly relevant 
was Ms. McClure's conclusion that the bookkeeping and accounting processes employed by 
Brian Watkins were inconsistent with standard practices based on extensive commingling of 
funds, systematic deletion of transaction detail which limits an independent analysis and 
evaluation of the transactions recorded, also rendering a complete reconstruction of the 
accounting records virtually impossible; inaccurate, incomplete, and misleading account records; 
and failure to maintain critical docurnentation.46 The evidence presented at trial pertaining to the 
amount alleged due and owing by Doug was confusing at best considering the varying 
calculations which were based on the records of Brian Watkins. The final calculation of 
$528,640.43 presented at trial is uncertain and unreliable having been based on assumptions, 
. d 1 . 47 estimates, an specu at1on. 
43 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 44, 1. 15-20. 
44 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 67, 11. 2-9. 
45 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 80, 1. 15 - p. 81, 1. 8. 
46 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 93, 1. 7 - p. 98, 1. 6; Defense Trial Exhibits G, H and I; and, R., pp. 239-290 and 811-
826. 
47 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 100, 1. 21 - p. 107, l. 17. 
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II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the Court erred in finding no notice of default or acceleration was 
required on the nursing home real estate contract. 
B. Whether the Court erred in finding that Piaintifi proved damages to a degree oi 
reasonable certainty. 
C. Whether the Court erred in finding that the Compensation Agreement is not 
valid and enforceable. 
D. Whether the Court erred in not applying the equitable doctrine of judicial 
estoppel, finding Plaintiff was never obligated to compensate Doug and 
concluding Plaintiff's obligation was a personal or moral obligation. 
E. Whether the Court erred in granting Plaintiff's Motion for Costs and Attorney 
Fees without a hearing on Doug's objection. 
F. Whether the Court erred in denying Doug's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs 
determining Doug did not prevail on six of the seven claims brought by Plaintiff. 
G. Whether the Court erred in finding that Plaintiff was the prevailing party. 




A. Standard of Review. 
"Review of a trial court's conclusions following a bench trial is limited to ascertaining 
whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 8 
,,48 it is court to 
and to judge the credibility of witnesses, this will liberally construe trial 
court's findings of fact in favor of the judgment entered.49 This Court will not set aside a trial 
court's findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous.50 If the trial court based its 
findings on substantial evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, this Court will not overturn 
those findings on appeal. 51 Additionally, this Court will not substitute its view of the facts for 
that of the trial court. 52 This Court exercises free review over matters of law.53 
B. The Court erred in finding no notice of default or acceleration was required on the 
nursing home real estate contract. 
The Court erred in its findings of fact related to the monies owed by Doug by failing to 
find no notice of default or accelerations was required on the nursing home real estate contract. 54 
Candidly, the Court's findings that Doug owed Plaintiff $528,640.43 are not supported by 
substantial evidence. While the Court correctly determined Plaintiff failed to establish that Doug 
ever received either a default notice or a notice of acceleration on the real estate contract, those 
factual findings are not addressed in the conclusions of law. The Court relies on its Order 
Granting Partial Summary Judgment dated December 1, 2014, finding Doug was in default on 
48 Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 488-89, 129 P.3d 1235, 1237-38 (2006) (citing Alumet v. Bear Lake 
Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946,949,812 P.2d 253,256 (1991)). 
49 Rowleyv. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105,107,982 P.2d 940,942 (1999). 
50 Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641,643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006); I.R.C.P. 52(a). 
51 Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho at 489, 129 P.3d at 1238. 
52 Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., 143 Idaho at 643, 152 P.3d at 4. 
53 Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 794, 53 P.3d 1211, 1213 (2002) (citing Bouten Constr. Co. v. H.F. Magnuson 
Co., 133 Idaho 756,760,992 P.2d 751, 755 (1999)); Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73, 77,205 P.3d 1209, 1213 
(2009); and, Big Wood Ranch, LLC v. Water Users' Ass'n of Broadford Slough, 158 Idaho 225, 345 P.3d 1015 
(2015). 
54 R., pp. 1267-1280. 
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estate contract as 0 
was on the 
balance due and owing. 55 It should be noted that Doug made partial payments on the real estate 
contract subsequent to August 2010 which were accepted on behalf of the Plaintiff. 56 In essence, 
the Court's findings appear to stand for the proposition that no further demand or notice 
declaring all amounts due immediately is required so as to effect a true acceleration of the entire 
balance owing on the real estate contract. Such a conclusion is contrary to the laws of the State 
of Washington which govern the contract. In Weinberg v. Naher, the Court stated, 
The debt does not become due on the mere default in the interest payment. Some 
affirmative action is required, some action by which the holder of the note makes 
known to the payors that he intends to declare the whole debt due. This exercise 
of the option may, of course, take different forms. It may be exercised by giving 
the payors formal notice to the effect that the whole debt is declared to be due, or 
by the commencement of an action to recover the debt, or perhaps by any means 
by which it is clearly brought home to the payors of the note that the option has 
been exercised ... 57 
Washington courts have continually reaffirmed the notice requirement, "Under Weinberg, 
acceleration must be made in a clear and unequivocal manner which effectively apprises the 
maker that the holder has exercised his right to accelerate the payment date."58 There was no 
evidence that Plaintiff ever exercised his option to accelerate the debt. 59 In fact, it is critical to 
reexamine the relief sought by Plaintiff in his Amended Complaint, specifically ,i 143: 
55 R., pp. 1180-1183. 
56 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 112, IL 1-3; Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 33 and 34; Trial Transcript Day 2, p. 188, I. 19-p. 
189, L 14. 
51 Weinberg v. Naher, 51 Wn. 591, 594, 99 P. 736 (1909). 
58 Glassmaker v. Ricard, 23 Wn.App. 35, 38, 593 P.2d 179 (1979). 
59 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 190, ll. 1-10. 
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on the Plaintiff respectfully requests that this court enter an 
order compelling Doug to produce any and records to 
including a detailed accounting, compelling Doug to comply with the terms of 
Doug's note, bring the same current, and award Plaintiff damages against Doug 
under the note. 60 
Cieariy, requesting Doug compiy with the terms of the contract and bring it current does not 
demonstrate Plaintiff had any intent to declare the note immediately due and owing. Based on 
the foregoing, there was not sufficient evidence for the Court to have found the real estate 
contract was properly accelerated. 
Further, the real estate contract provides that upon default the Seller may elect to either 
enforce the debt against the Purchaser by foreclosing under the contract by judicial proceeding as 
a mortgage or else by declaring the entire Purchaser's rights terminated.61 Plaintiff elected 
neither of the options provided in ,r 23 which clearly required notice to Defendant. 62 
Additionally, the real estate contract, in ,r 24 and 25, outlines the process in the event of a default 
including the ability to cure, the penalties, as well as how notice must be made. 63 The Court 
failed to recognize or acknowledge Plaintiffs non-compliance with the notice tenns and 
requirements contained in the real estate contract when Doug failed to make his monthly 
payments.64 The Court erred in finding Doug in default and owing $528,640.43 on the nursing 
home real estate contract when there was no notice of default or acceleration, nor adherence to 
the process provided for under the real estate contract when Doug failed to make monthly 
60 R., pp. 58-87. 
61 Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 37 at ,r 23; and, R., pp. 361-376. 
62 Id; and, Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 98, I. 25 -p. 99, I. 13. 
63 Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 37 at ,r,r 24 and 25; and, R., pp. 361-376. 
64 R., pp. 1268-1269. 
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C. The Court erred in :fmding Plaintiff proved damages to a degree of reasonable 
certainty. 
The issue of alleged damages under the real estate contract become more complicated in 
light of the lack of acceleration. Under the contract and in accordance with Washington law, 
default interest accrues only after there has been acceleration. 65 Plaintiffs expert based her 
findings and amount of damages on the assumption there had been an acceleration of the real 
estate contract and thus included default interest in her calculation of the amount allegedly due.66 
As there was never acceleration of the Note, the amounts Plaintiff claimed, which included 
default interest, are not accurate. 
Plaintiff is required to prove damages to a reasonable certainly and the damages must be 
removed from the realm of speculation. 67 "Reasonable certainty" is required to avoid awarding 
damages which are fabricated or based on conjecture or speculation.68 The evidence of damages 
presented by Plaintiff rests solely on the testimony and exhibits of his expert, Denise McClure. 
Ms. McClure's calculations and opinions were, in turn, based on speculation and assumptions 
deduced from records kept and generated by Brian Watkins who Plaintiff has been accused of 
fraud, conversion and horrible recordkeeping (among other things).69 
The string of reports generated by Ms. McClure for this case are evidence that the 
damages sought by Plaintiff could not be and were not proven to a reasonable degree of 
65 Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 37; R., pp. 361-376; and, Glassmaker v. Ricard, 23 Wn.App. 35, 38, 593 P.2d 179 (1979). 
66 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 98, I. 25 - p. 99, I. 13. 
67 Bratton v. Scott, 150 Idaho 530, 535,536,248 P.3d 1265 (Idaho 2011). 
6s Id 
69 R., pp. 58-87. 
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nor was 70 
2013 Denise McClure concluded t.11.e bookkeeping and accounting processes employed by 
Brian Watkins were inconsistent with standard practices based on extensive commingling of 
funds, systematic deletion of transaction detail which limits an independent analysis and 
evaluation of the transactions recorded, also rendering a complete reconstruction of the 
accounting records virtually impossible; inaccurate, incomplete, and misleading account records; 
and failure to maintain critical documentation. 71 Then on October 9, 2013, Denise McClure 
signed a Declaration wherein she stated as of August 2, 2010, the amount of $872,776.64 was 
immediately due and owing on Defendant's real estate contract. 72 The Declaration further stated 
as of September 30, 2013, Doug owed the sum of $1,536,783.60 on the real estate contract.73 
Denise McClure submitted another report dated March 11, 2014 which stated Doug owed 
$235,356 on the real estate contract as of August 2, 2010, $414,415 as of September 30, 2013, 
and $446,442 as of February 21, 2014.74 In her trial testimony, Ms. McClure confirmed that at 
one point in time she opined Doug owed $367,418.98 as of September 30, 2013 and as of 
September 1, 2013 she estimated Doug owed $361,989.14.75 Lastly, at trial Ms. McClure 
testified to yet another estimate of what she opined Doug owed under the real estate contract 
which was $528,640.43.76 All of Ms. McClure's figures incorporated a default interest rate of 
70 Trial Defense Exhibits G, Hand I; and, R., pp. 239-290 and 811-826. 
11 Id 
72 Trial Defense Exhibit K; and, R. pp. 494-499 (emphasis added). 
73 Id (emphasis added). 
74 Trial Defense Exhibit I; and, R. pp. 811-826 ( emphasis added). 
75 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 105, I. 19 - p. 106, I. 8 ( emphasis added). 
76 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 111, I. 18 - p. 112, I. 13 (emphasis added). 
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18% as of August, 2010, despite the fact that Doug was never served with any notice of 
acceleration. 
Plaintiffs expert based her findings and amount of damages on the assumption there had 
been an acceleration of the real estate contract and thereby included default interest. 78 As there 
·was never acceleration of the Note, the figures produced by Plaintiff which included default 
interest are not accurate. There was no testimony to account for the extreme difference in her 
opinions during the pendency of this case and at trial other than the ever changing assumptions 
employed. 79 Simply put, Plaintiff failed to provide cogent testimony or evidence whereby the 
Court could make a fmding that the alleged damages were proven to a reasonable degree of 
certainty. Instead, Plaintiffs damage figures are nothing more than speculation upon 
speculation, based on assumptions rather than fact. 
D. The Court erred in determining the compensation agreement was invalid and 
unenforceable. 
In a breach of contract action, a valid contract must first be established. A valid 
contract must be "complete, definite and certain in all its material terms, or contain provisions 
which are capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty."80 In contract actions, the court 
must first determine as a question of law whether the contract at issue is ambiguous. 81 Once the 
court makes such determination, a clear and unambiguous contract is interpreted as a question of 
77 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 90, IL 3-15. 
78 Id 
79 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 108, 1. 14 - p. 110, I. 2. 
80 Lawrence v. Jones, 124 Idaho 748, 750-751, 864 P.2d 194, 196-197 (Idaho App.,1993) (citing Giacobbi Square v. 
PEK Corp., 105 Idaho 346, 348, 670 P.2d 51, 53 (1983). 
81 Bakkerv. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC., 141 Idaho 185, 190, 108 P.3d 332, 337 (2005) citing Lamprecht v. 
Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 185-86, 75 P.3d 743, 746-47 (2003). 
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meaning, an contract as a 
82 In this case, the Court's ruling never addressed 
clear or unambiguous. 83 The Compensation Agreement 1s without question clear and 
unambiguous. Pursuant to the Compensation Agreement, Doug is entitled to enforce the terms 
of the agreement which clearly state Plaintiff was to pay Doug $3,000 per month for life as a 
retirement/disability benefit "[i]n consideration of the lifetime of work done by Payee [Douglas 
Watkins] for Payor [Arthur Donald Watkins]."84 As such, Doug is entitled to $3,000 per month 
beginning March 2009 and continuing until his death. Doug has not received any of the $3,000 
monthly payments as required since March 2009. 85 
Brian Watkins executed the Compensation Agreement as Plaintiffs agent pursuant to the 
General Power of Attorney dated October 24, 2000.86 In order for an agent to bind a principal to 
a third party in contract the agent must have actual or apparent authority. 87 Actual authority may 
be either express or implied. 88 Express authority occurs when a principal explicitly authorizes 
an agent to act on the principal' s behalf. Implied authority derives from those actions necessary 
to accomplish an act expressly authorized. 89 Apparent authority occurs when a principal by 
82 Id 
83 R., pp. 1268-1269. 
84 Defense Trial Exhibit Y; and R., pp. 317-319. 
85 Trial Transcript Day 2, p. 186, II. 17-23. 
86 Trial Transcript Day 2, p. 240, I. 24 - p. 241, I. 3. 
87 Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Servs., Inc., 123 Idaho 937,944, 854 P.2d 280,287 (Ct.App.1993). 
88 Landvik by Landvik v. Herbert, 130 Idaho 54, 58, 936 P.2d 697, 701 (Ct.App.1997). 
89 Id. 
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or an such a an 
business prudence would believe the agent is acting pursuant to 90 
A court may make a finding of apparent authority to protect third parties but only where 
the third party was not on notice of the scope of the agent's actual authority.91 The power of 
attorney at issue conclusively demonstrates Brian Watkins indeed had express authority to 
execute the compensation agreement and Doug was entitled to rely upon that authority.92 
Specifically, the general power of attorney provided Brian Watkins with the authority to execute 
and acknowledge all contracts and there is no evidence any limitations whatsoever were placed 
on that authority.93 Further the general power of attorney states third parties may rely upon the 
representations of the agent as to all matters.94 
The Court acknowledged the general power of attorney provided Brian Watkins with the 
power to enter into the compensation agreement.95 Further, the Court noted that, contrary to 
Plaintiffs contention, the compensation agreement was within the scope of Brian Watkins' 
general power of attorney.96 What is most perplexing is that the Court then determined the 
compensation agreement was invalid and unenforceable on two separate grounds.97 First, the 
Court stated the actions of Brian Watkins in executing the compensation agreement were not in 
compliance with the requirements of Idaho Code § 15-12-114( 1 ), requiring acting in good faith 
90 Id. at 59, 936 P.2d 697. 
91 Thomson v. Sunny Ridge VIII. P'ship, 118 Idaho 330, 332, 796 P.2d 539, 541 (Ct.App.1990). 
92 Trial Transcript Day 2, p. 280, II. 5 - 11; Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 11; and, R, pp. 304-308. 
93 Id.; and, Trial Transcript Day 2, p. 229, I. 25 - p. 230, I. 6 (emphasis added). 
94 Id. 
95 R., pp. 1267-1280. 
96 Id. at p. 1276 
97 Id. 
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and in the principal's best interest.98 However, such reasoning contradicts the Court's finding 
that Brian Watkins had the power to enter into the compensation agreement and that such 
agreement was within the scope of his power. Certainly such analysis could be relevant in an 
action by Plaintiff against Brian Watkins, but Brian Watkins' conduct whether it in bad faith or 
contrary to the principal's best interest has no application to Defendant's breach of contract 
claim against Plaintiff where there was no evidence Doug had knowledge of any limitations on 
Brian's authority. 
Next, the Court found that the compensation agreement lacked the consideration and 
''was nothing more than an unenforceable promise to pay. "99 Such a conclusion is not supported 
by the evidence presented at trial. The trial revealed certain relevant facts which supported 
Defendant's contention that the compensation agreement was a valid contract. First, the 
testimony of both Doug and Brian Watkins was that Plaintiff, on more than one occasion, stated 
he would provide each of his sons $3,000 a month for their lifetime of work for Plaintiff and 
injuries suffered therefrom. 100 There was uncontroverted evidence that Doug was employed by 
Plaintiff for a substantial length of time and was injured during that employment. 101 Further, 
Plaintiff did not provide health insurance or retirement benefits to Doug during the time he was 
employed by Plaintiff. 102 Doug was paid $3,000 per month continuously from at least October 
98 Id 
99 Id. 
100 Trial Transcript Day 2, p. 184, I. 24 - p. 185, l. 8, p. 236, I. 1-25, p. 238, l. 5-10, and p. 239, l. 9 - p. 240, I. 13. 
101 Trial Transcript Day 2, p. 172, I. 22 - p. 174, I. 4. 
102 Trial Transcript Day 2, p. 216, I. 23 - p. 217, 1. 9. 
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was a 
previous promises representations by Plaintiff to provide for 
Doug as demonstrated by the historical monthly payments in the amount of $3,000 to Doug since 
2000. 104 
E. The Court erred by not applying the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel, finding 
Plaintiff was never obligated to compensate Doug and concluding Plaintiff's 
obligation was a personal and moral obligation. 
The Court's conclusion that "Plaintiff was never obligated - in the legal sense - to give 
Doug a monthly sum for injuries Doug sustained while working for Plaintiff' completely 
disregards evidence that Plaintiff should be judicially estopped from denying his obligation to 
Defendant. Judicial estoppel precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position, 
and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position. 105 This Court has 
noted: 
It is quite generally held that where a litigant, by means of such sworn statements, 
obtains a judgment, advantage, or consideration from one party, he will not 
thereafter, by repudiating such allegations and by means of inconsistent and 
contrary allegations or testimony, be permitted to obtain recovery or a right 
against another party, arising out of the same transaction or subject matter. 106 
In his 1998 Utah divorce action, Plaintiff acknowledged, under oath, a $1,000 monthly 
financial obligation to Doug for injuries sustained during the course of his employment. 
The Respondent [Arthur Watkins] has obligations to three (3) of his sons in a 
103 Trial Transcript Day 2, p. 174, I. 5 -p. 180, I. 17. 
104 Id; and, Trial Transcript Day 2, p. 184, I. 24 - p. 185, I. 8, p. 236, I. 1-25, p. 238, I. 5-10, and p. 239, I. 9 - p. 
240, I. 13. 
105 Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 252, 92 P.3d 492, 502 (2004). 
106 Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87, 93-94, 277 P.2d 561, 565 (1954). 
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V'VL.U~ .... v~ amount $5,300.00 per month. $3,000 month is being paid to 
Brian, a son who was injured while working on Respondent's ranch. $1,000.00 is 
being paid to his son, Doug, who was also injured by working on the ranch. 
$1,300.00 is being paid to Eugene, who was injured when he was working for a 
business the Respondent used to own in Boise, Idaho. These three (3) sons are 
unable to hold full time jobs because of the injuries they received while working 
for Respondent. The Respondent has been paying these sums to his sons since 
approximately 1989, which pre-dates the Respondent's marriage to Petitioner. 
Without these funds, these individuals would not be able to sustain themselves 
and their families. This is not being done as a charity, but because of an 
obligation owed by Respondent .. .. (emphasis added). 107 
Based on these representations, Plaintiff argued in the divorce action that "he is not able to 
pay any more than approximately $1,000 per month to the Petitioner. .. "108 From his sworn 
statement, Plaintiff clearly gained an advantage in his divorce proceeding. As a result, Plaintiff 
should have been estopped from taking an inconsistent position in this litigation. To allow 
otherwise would diminish the importance of the doctrine of judicial estoppel by allowing 
Plaintiff to play fast and loose with the courts by taking inconsistent positions in an effort to 
circumvent his obligation to Defendant. Notwithstanding the evidence and the law, the Court 
plainly stated that, "Plaintiff's obligation, even back in 1998, was at most a personal or moral 
obligation" although there was no evidence to support such a finding. 109 
F. The Court erred in granting Plaintiff's Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees without 
a hearing on Defendant's Objection to Costs. 
The Court's Award of Plaintiff's Costs and Attorney Fees dated March 4, 2016 failed to 
comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(5), which provides: 
107 Defense Trial Exhibit B; Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 308, 1. 25 -p. 310, 1. 21 and p. 315, II. 14-17; and, R., pp. 
223-237. 
ws Id 
109 R., p. 1278. 
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Within days of a memorandum 
filing and a motion to disallow part or all of the costs. 
The motion does not stay execution on the judgment, exclusive of costs, and must 
be heard and determined by the court as other motions under these rules. 
Failure to timely object to the items in the memorandum of costs constitutes a 
waiver of all objections to the costs claimed ( emphasis added). 
Under the rule, when Doug filed his Objection to Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney 
Fees, it must be heard and determined by the Court.11° However, the Court summarily awarded 
Plaintiff exactly what was requested in Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees 
while denying Doug the opportunity to be heard on his objection. 
Secondly, Doug timely objected to Plaintiff's request for attorney fees in the amount of 
$159,719.92 and costs in the amount of $6,908.74 contending the fees and costs were 
excessive. 111 The Court has discretion under this section to determine whether the request of 
attorney fees is reasonable. 112 Further, the issues involved at trial were not particularly novel or 
complex. As such, it cannot be said that any specific expertise was required. Likewise, Plaintiff 
has not shown that this type of case is particularly undesirable or that there were particular 
pressures involved in this litigation. 113 In light of these factors, Plaintiff's request is excessive 
and the Court should exercise its discretion in eliminating altogether, or reducing, the amount of 
attorney fees claimed in the event the court awards Plaintiff any attorney fees. 
110 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(5). 
111 R., pp. 1696-1717. 
112 See Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911,591 P.2d 1078 (1979). 
113 R., pp. 1657-1660. 
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§ 1 as 
In any civil action to recover on an open account ... and in any commercial 
transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be 
allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and 
collected as costs. 
The term, "com,.'Tiercial tr&'lsaction" is defined to mean all trai1sactions except 
transactions for personal or household purposes. 
Idaho courts use a two part test to determine whether attorney fees are proper under this 
section: (1) there must be a commercial transaction that is integral to the claim; and (2) the 
commercial transaction must be the basis upon which recovery is sought. 114 Indeed, "It has long 
been held that '[t]he critical test is whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen 
of the lawsuit; the commercial transaction must be integral to the claim and constitute a basis on 
which the party is attempting to recover."' 115 In determining the amount of attorney fees, the 
court is vested with discretion. 116 When considering the amount of attorney fees to be awarded 
under Idaho Code§ 12-120, the court must consider the factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). 117 
The Rule 54(e)(3) factors include: 
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) 
the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and 
ability of the attorney in the particular field of law; ( 4) the prevailing charges for 
like work; ( 5) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; ( 6) the time limitations 
imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case; (7) the amount involved 
and the results obtained; (8) the undesirability of the case; (9) the nature and 
length of the professional relationship with the client; (I 0) awards in similar 
ll 4 Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, 128 Idaho 72, 78,910 P.2d 744, 750 (1996). 
115 Great Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp. 136 Idaho 466,471, 36 P.3d218, 223 (2001), citing 
Bingham v. Montane Resource Associates, 133 Idaho at 426, 987 P.2d at 1041 (1999). 
116 DeWills Interiors, Inc. v. Dines, 106 Idaho 288,678 P.2d 80 (1984). 
117 Spidell v. Jenkins, 111 Idaho 857, 727 P.2d 1285 (Ct. App. 1986). 
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cases; reasoriatJte cost court 
it was L'-'UJVLJLUVL preparing a case. 
The court may also consider any other factor it deems appropriate in the particular case. 118 
Having not been provided an opportunity to argue his objection to Plaintiff's attorneys fees, it is 
nearly impossible to assess whether the court applied the factors required in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) 
when it awarded Plaintiff attorney fees in the full amount Plaintiff requested. 
G. Standard of Review - The trial court erred in finding that Plaintiff was the 
prevailing party. 
A trial court's determination of whether a party prevailed is a matter of discretion. 119 "A 
district court's exercise of discretion will be upheld absent a showing of abuse of discretion."120 
The boundaries of the district court's discretion are guided by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B), which 
provides: "In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the 
[district] court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in 
relation to the relief sought by the respective parties."121 To determine whether an abuse of 
discretion occurred, this Court considers (1) whether the district court correctly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the district court acted within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion and consistently with the applicable legal standards and (3) whether the district court 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 122 
118 I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(L). 
119 Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425, 434-35, 111 P.3d 110, 119-20 (2005). 
120 Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 771, 133 P.3d 1232, 1236 (2006). 
121 I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). 
122 Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). 
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Where mere fact that a IS 
successful asserting or defeating a single claim does not mandate an award of fees to the 
prevailing party on that claim. 123 The rule does not require that; it mandates an award of fees 
only to the party who prevailed "in the action."124 The trial court must consider the result of the 
action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties, whether there were multiple 
claims or issues, and the extent to which each party prevailed upon each issue or claim. 125 
In this case, it cannot be said that Plaintiff prevailed "in the action." While Plaintiff 
prevailed on one cause of action against Doug Watkins, Doug Watkins was ultimately the 
prevailing party based on the dismissal of the remaining seven claims against him. 126 Plaintiff's 
First Amended Complaint alleged eight claims against Doug Watkins. 127 The trial commenced 
on October 13, 2015 and Plaintiff rested his case the afternoon of October 13, 2015. 128 However, 
Plaintiff only presented evidence on Count XI alleged in the First Amended Complaint. Based 
on Plaintiff's failure to present any evidence whatsoever to prove the remaining claims, Doug 
moved for a directed verdict. 129 Quite simply, Plaintiff having put forth no evidence and thus no 
prima facie case, Doug moved for the remaining counts to be dismissed pursuant to a directed 
verdict. 130 Only after being prompted by the Court as to Plaintiff's position on the motion for 
directed verdict, did Plaintiff reply " ... we withdrew those. And I would consider that a voluntary 
123 Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687, 682 P.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1984). 
124 Id (emphasis added). 
125 Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406, 4 I 1, 659 P.2d 160, 165 (Ct. App. I 983); Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
54(d)(l)(B). 
126 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 154, I. 16--:-p. 166, I. 24. 
127 R., pp. 58-87. 
128 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 154, 11. 7-8. 
129 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 154, I. 16 - p. 166, I. 24. 
Bo Id. 
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a a asked 
counsel to go through on the record. 132 
First, Plaintiffs counsel acknowledged the fifth cause of action had been dismissed previously 
by the Court. 133 Plaintiff's counsel stated the sixth cause of action "we have withdrawn, taken a 
voluntary dismissal." 134 According to Plaintiffs counsel, the seventh, eighth, ninth causes of 
action and the claim for punitive damages against Doug Watkins have been dismissed. 135 
Doug contends that the dismissal of the remaining claims, which occurred only after the 
Plaintiff rested his case and Doug moved for a directed verdict, should not be ignored in 
determining the prevailing party in this case. First, Plaintiff never made a motion to the court to 
dismiss any of the claims against Doug even after cross motions for summary judgment were 
argued and decided by the Court. Secondly, there was never a motion for voluntary dismissal 
under LR.C.P. 41(a)(l) prior to Doug's motion for directed verdict. 
Based on the First Amended Complaint in conjunction with the multitude of declarations 
and various reports from the experts in the case, Plaintiff alleged the fraud and deceit perpetrated 
upon him by Doug Watkins and the other defendant resulted in an excess of million dollars in 
damages. 136 The dismissal of Count V by itself makes Doug the prevailing party. 
131 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 164, 11. 22-25. 
132 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 165, I. 8 p. 166, I. 24. 
133 Trial Transcript Day I, p. 165, ll. 20-22. 
134 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 165, IL 23-25. 
135 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 166, IL 1-18. 
136 Trial Defense Exhibits G, H, I and Q; and, R., pp. 58-87, 239-290, 494-500, 555-560, 585-618 and 811-826. 
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on one a 
$528,640.43. 137 Meanwhile, Plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case against 
Doug on the five remaining claims constructive trust, unjust enrichment, conversion, civil 
RICO, and punitive damages - Doug is the prevailing party on those claims. In conclusion, since 
Plaintiff only prevailed on one of the eight claims against Doug, Plaintiff is not entitled to fees 
and costs in this matter. Stated another way, this case, from the inception was about Plaintiff's 
pursuit of significant fraud claims against his sons and Doug prevailed on those claims. 
Doug prevailed on a majority of claims and avoided hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
potential liability. Further, Doug presented legitimate issues even on the claims on which he did 
not prevail. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in finding that Plaintiff is entitled 
to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. As such, the determination that Plaintiff is 
entitled to such fees should be reversed. 
H. Appellant is Entitled to His Attorney's Fees and Costs in Pursuing this Appeal. 
Because Appellant believes that he will prevail on the issues argued above, Appellant is 
entitled to his attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code 12-120(3), 12-121 and I.A.R. 41. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests the Court reverse the findings 
of the trial court, vacate the judgment against Appellant and the award of attorney fees and costs. 
137 R., pp. 1267-1280. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 25 
Appellant 
damages and attorney fees and costs favor of Appellant. 
fk 
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